World Geostrategic Insights interview with Farshad Adel on the U.S. strategy in the Middle East, Iran’s role in the changing regional geopolitical landscape, China’s approach to the Middle East, and the implications of the Iran-Israel conflict on relations between China and Iran.
Q1 – Alongside the historical confrontation between Israel and Iran, which made the recent war predictable, some analysts suggest that the U.S. aims to contain China by destabilizing Iran. To what extent do you agree with this view?
A1 To accurately understand the ultimate goal of the U.S. and Israel’s confrontation with Iran, we must take a broader view of regional and international developments, considering Iran’s role as a piece of a larger puzzle often referred to as the “new order” in recent years.
It is crucial to analyze recent regional developments in the context of current events and realities, based on facts and existing trends. Otherwise, we risk making dangerous miscalculations, which, in the current context, could come with significant costs.
Implementing the new order in the Middle East is perhaps the most critical project currently pursued by the U.S. government, as the region possesses capacities that could ensure America’s superpower status in the coming decades.
We must recognize that the primary priority for both the U.S. and China, as two major global powers, is not merely economic development but achieving dominance in high-tech industries and advanced technologies, which naturally requires capital and energy.
Understanding this, the U.S. has pursued the new order project in the Middle East to prevent China from accessing the region’s opportunities. To better grasp this, we should note that, according to China’s grand strategies, the country aims to become a global high-tech superpower by 2049 and is making strong progress in this direction.
China’s rapid advancements in this field and its success in fostering leading high-tech companies have created the conditions for it to leverage the Middle East’s potential. This potential includes two critical aspects: first, the Middle East has access to affordable energy, which can facilitate the rapid growth of high-tech industries. As the world’s largest energy consumer, China naturally requires this affordable energy to develop its industries and achieve its goal of becoming a high-tech superpower.
The second key factor is the weak bureaucracy in Middle Eastern countries and the presence of authoritative rulers who can allocate billions of dollars to research and development in high-tech projects with a single decision, making them suitable hosts for high-tech companies.
For this reason, in recent years, China has shown significant interest in engaging with Arab countries, and a promising outlook for high-tech cooperation between Arab nations and China was conceivable.
However, with the rise of Trump, we observed that the U.S., fully aware of China’s intentions, quickly prioritized strengthening ties with Arab countries to prevent China from achieving its goals. Trump’s first foreign trip in his second presidency was to the Middle East, targeting Arab nations.
During this visit, Trump, accompanied by numerous high-tech industry leaders such as Elon Musk and Dara Khosrowshahi, met with Arab leaders, and billions of dollars in contracts were signed to foster close cooperation between Arab countries and U.S. high-tech industries.
This is part of the new order project in the region, which, if consolidated, will position the U.S. favorably against China and secure its superpower status for decades to come.
In this context, ensuring stability in the Middle East is critical for achieving definitive results, and this is currently only possible through economic integration between regional countries and the U.S.
Moreover, stability in the region, which would lead to economic and commercial integration among regional countries, could serve as a fundamental guarantee for securing Israel’s existence in the region.
In other words, fostering economic integration among regional countries through initiatives like the Abraham Accords, with Israel playing a prominent role in regional commercial initiatives such as the IMEC corridor, will elevate Israel’s role in the global value chain.
This will secure Israel’s existence in the region and end regional conflicts with it, fulfilling one of the U.S.’s key commitments to Israel—a win-win outcome for both the U.S. and Israel.
However, in such a context, ignoring Iran—a country with a population of 90 million and abundant natural resources—is impractical. Destabilizing such a country would create a significant security vacuum at the heart of the region.
We must not forget that Iran has 15 neighboring countries, and any chaos resulting from its destabilization could spread crises to other parts of the region. Based on geopolitical logic and current trends, the U.S. cannot afford to jeopardize all its planning.
Therefore, I reject this idea and believe that the U.S.’s primary goal is to neutralize Iran’s threat to advance the Abraham Accords and implement the new order in the region. In the next phase, the U.S. will likely attempt to integrate Iran into this new order through any possible means.
Q2 . What are the consequences, opportunities, and threats of the recent Iran-Israel war for China?
A2. As mentioned, dominating the Middle East and consolidating a Western-led order in the region is directly tied to containing China and ensuring U.S. superpower status for decades to come.
However, it is important to understand that, contrary to some assumptions, China has no intention of challenging U.S. supremacy in the current period or for several decades. All of China’s official security and political documents emphasize that it still considers itself a developing country.
Although it is impossible to predict what will happen in the distant future, it is clear that China currently has no intention of challenging the United States and is doing everything possible to avoid confrontation with it.
This is why China, unlike the U.S., does not show interest in playing a prominent political or security role in the Middle East and focuses on expanding relations with regional countries solely in the commercial and economic domains, resulting in approximately $400 billion in trade with Persian Gulf countries.
In summary, China is fully aware of U.S. efforts to contain it but will strive to gradually overcome the U.S. through patience, a process that may take decades.
Q3. Specifically, is the recent war related to the rivalry between the architects and builders of the IMEC and BRI corridors?
A3 – We must recognize that fostering economic integration between Israel and regional countries is essential for securing Israel’s existence in the region, and this is achievable through initiatives like the IMEC or the Middle Corridor.
Regarding corridors, it is important to emphasize that a corridor is not merely a trade route. Rather, it is a tool for shaping value and production chains that economically bind countries together, naturally yielding political and security outcomes.
For this reason, countries strive to create such initiatives to facilitate the participation and cooperation of various nations. In today’s world, being part of global value chains or economic agreements is equivalent to being part of a security pact.
The same principle applies to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is why the Chinese refer to it as an “initiative.”
This initiative is supported by three new initiatives—Global Development, Global Civilization, and Global Security—providing a set of intellectual products to achieve China’s long-term goals. These could eventually position China as the leader of developing nations and the Afro-Eurasian axis, equipping it with the tools to compete with the U.S., the leader of the Western order and the Euro-Atlantic axis.
However, as mentioned, this is a very long-term goal, and currently, only its theoretical foundations are being developed.
Q4. How important is the continuation of Iran’s current governance, which operates independently of the Western bloc, to China?
A4. Naturally, Iran’s presence in the region as an actor opposed to the U.S. benefits China by diverting U.S. attention from containing China. However, maintaining such an actor in this conflict contradicts China’s policy of avoiding significant political and security involvement in a volatile region like the Middle East, at least preventing China from openly supporting Iran.
Moreover, we must not forget that China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and consistently positions itself as a guardian of international order and security. Therefore, one of the prerequisites for developing Iran-China relations, as emphasized by the Chinese, is Iran’s integration into the international order and the establishment of normal relations with the world, leading to the resolution of issues like sanctions and enabling significant Chinese economic engagement in Iran.
Thus, we must recognize that China, as an economic power, has the confidence to address developments in a principled manner consistent with international norms. While an anti-U.S. Iran may benefit China, this is not of critical importance in practice. As we observe, China’s strongest regional relationships are with Arab countries, which are key political allies of the U.S. in the region.
Therefore, we should not expect China to take actions beyond political support for our positions. The reality is that Iran’s share of China’s global foreign trade is approximately 0.23%, and if Iran’s alignment with the U.S. enables seamless Chinese access to Iran’s untapped market, this would likely be welcomed by China.
Consequently, China may even cooperate with the U.S. to resolve Iran’s issues and stabilize the region, as an unstable Iran could foster extremist or separatist movements that threaten China’s security, particularly in sensitive regions like Xinjiang. Thus, maintaining stability in Iran and cooperating to promote its development are also security priorities for China, which would be more achievable if Iran’s issues with the West are resolved.
Q5. Considering China’s serious concerns about the continuity of energy trade through the Malacca Strait, would disrupting Iran and placing Persian Gulf energy security under a West-aligned government be detrimental to China?
A5. As previously noted, China considers itself a guardian of international order and security and, despite criticisms of the West and the U.S., emphasizes preserving the international order in all its strategic documents. With a full understanding of political and security considerations, China leverages its prominent economic role to manage its rivals’ actions, and competitors like the U.S. acknowledge China’s significant weight in international equations.
Thus, it is naive to assume that China’s reliance on straits through which energy flows poses a serious threat under normal circumstances.
Yes, in a hypothetical scenario where China faces an all-out military conflict with the West or crippling sanctions, it is not far-fetched to imagine these straits being used to harm China. However, we are not currently dealing with such a China, and China strives to avoid such a crisis, making this scenario highly unlikely.
Therefore, even with an Iran aligned with the West, no significant threat would likely face China in this regard. In fact, such an Iran could create new economic and political opportunities for China.
For example, de-escalation between Iran and the West, leading to Iran’s integration into the international order and free trade with the world, could enable China to access Iran’s vast energy resources, potentially via overland pipelines, which would be a significant advantage for China.
We must not forget that in today’s world, countries have deeply interconnected relationships, and any threat to international security, such as closing straits, would cause substantial damage to the global economy and, consequently, all countries.
Thus, nations strive to increase their influence in global developments through initiatives and secure the necessary deterrence. In this regard, China enjoys maximum deterrence, as the U.S. and Europe are its largest trading partners, and despite political differences, there is significant economic interdependence among these powers. Therefore, we must approach these issues based on existing realities, not unlikely probabilities.
Q6. Why was China a passive actor in the recent Iran-Israel war, and how will it behave moving forward? Are our expectations of China unrealistic?
A6. The primary reason for China’s passivity regarding Iran-related developments is that we do not have deep relations with China. Unfortunately, the architecture of Iran-China relations has been shaped from the outset by a romanticized perspective, assuming that because China is our largest trading partner, the Chinese should also consider Iran a significant partner.
In reality, compared to other regional countries, we neither have substantial trade volumes with China nor have we developed grand strategies to elevate our relations with China. Naturally, as a global power, China prioritizes its national interests above all else, and the current risks of engaging with Iran do not align with China’s national interests.
Unlike other regional countries that have robust strategies to develop relations with China and strive to enhance their appeal to China as the world’s second-largest economy through various initiatives, we remain entirely passive.
Currently, Iran has not presented any grand strategy that complements China’s development-oriented policies to the region or the world, rendering Iran a marginal partner for China.
This is despite Iran’s potential—both economically and in political and security terms—being greater than that of all regional countries for cooperation. We share significant civilizational ties with China, and the documented history of Iran-China relations dates back over two thousand years, with the actual history likely being far older. However, until Iran establishes itself as a serious, development-oriented actor with initiatives and grand strategies, it will not be attractive to other countries, and its potential, no matter how significant, will remain unrealized.
Thus, it is natural that China is unwilling to incur costs by supporting Iran, as politics is the realm of on-the-ground realities.
We must understand that tolerance and adaptability have historically been dominant in our country’s culture, and Iran’s resilience over thousands of years stems from its flexibility in the face of events. The wealth and power of Iran over centuries have been driven by this spirit of global engagement, with the Silk Road being a prime example.
Unfortunately, Iran today is perceived in the international arena as a country intent on challenging the international order, which increases the cost of cooperation with us, particularly for a country like China that seeks to strengthen the “China brand” as a development-oriented nation committed to the international order.
Q7. One of the expectations Iranians have from China is the enhancement of Iran’s defense infrastructure and equipment. Why don’t the Chinese provide Iran with advanced military equipment, as they do for Pakistan?
A7. Naturally, reaching such a stage with China requires Iran to be recognized as a normal actor in the international arena. You mentioned Pakistan, which is an excellent example. Despite its rivalry with India, which is an existential and inherent conflict, the two countries maintain open embassies and diplomatic relations.
Compare this to Iran, which has had no diplomatic relations with a country like the U.S. for decades, and due to some past radical actions, an unreasonable image of our country has unfortunately been portrayed.
These are critical issues that we must address and seek to rectify.
Today, we need a form of rebranding for Iran’s image and must adopt new policies to create the conditions for strategic cooperation with global powers.
Providing advanced military equipment to Iran requires us first to establish strategic relations with China and ensure that the Chinese do not perceive that we would use this equipment to challenge the U.S. without adhering to international order and security. Such actions would also reflect on China’s record, which is entirely inconsistent with China’s grand policies and its peaceful rise approach.
Thus, we conclude that Iran’s type of engagement and its integration into the international order, which China considers itself a guardian of, are prerequisites for forming strategic relations with China and, subsequently, high-level military cooperation. This has been emphasized by the Chinese in various meetings and should be taken seriously by us as well.